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MICHAEL BÖTTNER and ARNOLD GÜNTHER
Introduction
It is our intention in this paper to give explicit definitions of semiotic
concepts as they were used in phenomenological writings by A. Schütz,
thus clarifying a system of concepts that seems to be of some relevance for
the development of a framework for semiotics. The system of semiotic
concepts proposed by A. Schütz, however, is not in a state in which it can
be used or studied by nonphenomenologists without problems. We try to
remedy this deplorable situation by giving the first steps of a recon-
struction of his ideas (a reconstruction as it is understood in analytical
philosophy).
In his presentation of his semiotics Schütz does not distinguish explicitly
between the elaboration of the system of concepts and the formulation of
theses on the basis of the concepts introduced. When presenting Schütz's
semiotics it is our intention to distinguish explicitly between the in-
troduction and the use of a concept, thus taking over the part of
Procrustes. The bed we offer our guest A. Schütz consists of a standard-
ized language that we shall introduce in our third section. Before we do
that, we give — in the second section — a rough sketch of Schütz's
semiotics, without distinguishing between the introduction and the use of
concepts. In the final section we use the concepts introduced under
'Explicit definitions' for the formulation of some theses of Schütz's
semiotics.
Informal presentation
Schütz presents his semiotic system in three steps. These three steps may
be conceived of as the realization of a definition in the style of traditional
logic by giving the genus proximum (step 1) and differentiae specificae
(steps 2 and 3) of a general concept of semiotic relation comprising four
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subrelations. In our informal sketch of his system we follow his procedure.
In step l Schütz introduces E. HusseiTs concept of appresentation that
describes the phenomenon of pairing common to all sign relations. Pairing
is a general characteristic of human consciousness that enables an
individual to experience an object as referring to another object. If the
experiences of two objects a and b are present simultaneously in the
consciousness of an individual, a pair (a, b) is constituted such that,
whenever one of those objects is experienced, the experience of the
corresponding object is produced. Every object is experienced as a
member of an order (or structured set) of objects. As a consequence,
various schemes are distinguished in which objects may be experienced.
Let the object a appresent the object b for an individual: the structured set
to which a belongs is the 'apperceptual scheme' of a, b; the structured set
to which a together with the appresentational relation belongs is called the
'appresentational scheme' of a, b; the structured set to which b belongs is
called the 'referential scheme' of a, b; the structured set to which the
relation between a and b belongs is called the 'situationaF or 'contextual
scheme' of a, b. If an individual is in an appresentational situation, he may
experience the objects involved in one of those four schemes and, as a
consequence of this, appresentational relations are characteristically
ambiguous. Moreover, appresentational relations are ambiguous due to
another fact: they are subject to internal structural changes. As principles
of these changes Schütz mentions: (a) the principle of the relative
irrelevance of the vehicle, (b) the principle of the variability of appresen-
tational meanings, and (c) the principle of figurative transference.
In step 2, Schütz investigates the motives for the use of sign relations by
human individuals. His basic contention is: human individuals use sign
relations in order to cope with experiences of transcendency of various
kinds. First he shows what sort of transcendency an individual has at a
certain point of his biographical existence, regardless of his relations to
other persons. At each point of his existence, an individual finds himself in
a world that he takes as given. This world is experienced depending on the
individual's stock of knowledge and relevance system and is altered by
acting. In the world given to an individual, certain regions are to be
distinguished. The region of the world that is perceived by the individual
at a certain moment is called the world within actual reach. The region of
objects in the world of actual reach that can be manipulated is called the
manipulatory sphere. At each moment of his existence, an individual has
recollections of his previous world(s) within actual reach and anticipations
of his future world(s) within actual reach. The first one is called the world
within restorable reach, if the individual is able — by a change of position
— to reach that region of the world. Indication and mark are defined as
those sign relations that enable an individual to cope with certain
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experiences that transcend the manipulatory sphere, the world within
actual reach, and the world within restorable reach.
In the second part of step 2, Schütz deals with those transcendent
experiences an individual has when his relations to other persons are not
disregarded. Signs are defined as those semiotic relations that enable the
individual to cope with the transcendent experiences referring to the
intellectual and psychic life of other persons. The intellectual and psychic
life of an individual is transcendent for every other individual and can
only be experienced by the use of signs. The use of signs is fundamental for
communication between individuals. Idealizations on the exchangeability
of standpoints and the congruence of systems of relevance are pre-
suppositions for the understanding of signs. The world where communi-
cation is possible is the so-called everyday world.
In step 3, experiences of those objects that transcend the everyday world
are investigated. Appresentational relations that pair objects of the
everyday world with objects transcending the everyday world are called
symbols. Besides the everyday world there are various regions having their
own style of confirmation. Schütz calls them finite provinces of meaning.
These finite provinces of meaning are distinguished from each other by
their styles of experience (perception, dream, fiction, etc.). There is one
paramount finite province of meaning among them, characterized by the
following properties:
(1) It contains human individuals as physical objects uninterruptedly;
(2) Its objects put limitations on human activities;
(3) It can be altered by human individuals;
(4) It is the only province where communication is possible.
Schütz calls this finite province of meaning the world of everyday life.
Symbols are defined as those relations of appresentations by which human
individuals cope with experiences that transcend the world of everyday
life.
Explicit definitions
As was noted earlier, it is not our intention to give explicit definitions of all
concepts introduced or used by Schütz. Only those concepts will be
defined explicitly that we consider directly relevant for semiotics or a
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In order to define these central concepts we introduce auxiliary concepts,
some of them by explicit definition; others we take to be primitive. Of








world of actual reach
world of potential reach
world of everyday life (everyday world)
transcendence
cogitation
finite province of meaning





The primitive concepts, if not immediately evident, will be described
intuitively. They will be introduced just before their first use. Other




As is usual, we distinguish between a concept and the linguistic
expression designating it. For purposes of explicit definition we use
standardizations of the linguistic expressions, thus clarifying the nature of
the concepts designated by them; clarifying the nature of a relational
concept, for instance, we understand to be specifying the number and the
category of its relata. The standardized forms we introduce are the
following:
(5) a is immediately given to ι at t
in ι objects a and b are paired at t
a appresents b at t for /
ι manipulates a at t
the manipulatory sphere of i at t
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the world within actual reach of / at /
/ and j are in a face-to-face situation
the world within potential reach of / at t
the world of everyday life
a transcends world w at t
α is a cogitation of / at /
e is a style of experience
α is a finite province of meaning
a is relevant for / at t
a is a mark of b for / at /
α is an indication of b for / at t
α is a sign of b for / at t
α is a symbol of b for i at t
i communicates with j at / by means of α
i communicates withy at t
i understands the cogitation of j (at /)
/ understands α at t
i is an interpreter of α at t
As is evident from (5), we use /, j as variables ranging over individuals
(persons); f, t' ranging over points of time; α and b ranging over objects;
w ranging over worlds; and e ranging over styles of experience. No
ontological commitments are to be connected with this use of variables;
we might as well use just one sort of variables and add predicates.
In connection with each of the subsequent definitions, we describe the
relations the concept defined has to other concepts, and we cite textual
evidence for our standardization (and the interpretation presupposed by
that standardization).
The definition of appresentation presupposes the concept of pairing,
and the concept of pairing presupposes the concept of immediate
givenness. As we take this concept as primitive (cf. (3)), we give no
definition of it but only some sort of intuitive characterization.
(6) An object α is immediately given to an individual / at t if i perceives a
at / or / dreams a at t or / remembers a at / or i imagines a at /, etc.
'... the (appresenting) immediate experience need by no means consist in
the perception of the physical object: it may be a recollection, a fantasm, a
dream etc' (p. 297).
(7) Definition
In an individual i two objects a and b are paired at a moment i if
(i) a is immediately given to / at t and
(ii) b is immediately given to / at t.
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The most primitive case of a coupling or pairing association is character-
ized by the fact that two or more data are intuitively given in the unity of
consciousness, which, by this very reason, constitutes two distinct pheno-
mena as a unity regardless of whether or not they are attended to' (p. 295).
We want to draw attention to the fact that objects that are paired in an
individual may not only be perceived but also remembered or imagined
(cf. (6)). "... pairing is also possible between an actual perception and a
recollection, between a perception and a fantasm (fictutn) ...' (p. 296).
(8) Definition
An object a appresents an object b at a moment / for an individual / if
(i) in i a and b are printed at a moment /' prior to / and
(ii) a is immediately given to / at t and
(iii) b is not immediately given to / at t.
The appresenting term, that which is present in immediate apperception,
is coupled or paired with the appresented term' (p. 295).
The result of the passive synthesis of association here involved is that the
apprehension of a present element of a previously constituted pair
"wakens" or "calls forth" the appresented element ...' (pp. 296-297).
'In all these cases an object, fact, or event is not experienced as a "self,
but as standing for another object which is not given in immediacy to the
experiencing subject' (p. 297).
It is not clear whether Schütz considers appresentation to be a relation
between objects (p. 296, §1) or experiences (p. 297, §2). We take Object' in
our definitions to comprise objects as well as experiences (of objects). In
some definitions, however, Object' must be understood as 'physical object'
(see, e.g., (9)), but it will be obvious where it should be understood with
this qualification.
The concept of the manipulatory sphere of an individual is used in the
definition of 'mark' and 'communication'. We take 'manipulation' as a
primitive concept; cf. its standardized designation in (5).
(9) Definition
The manipulatory sphere of / at t is that region of the world containing
the objects that can be manipulated by i at t.
The manipulatory sphere is the region open to my immediate interference
which I can modify either directly by movements of my body or with the
help of artificial extensions of my body, that is, by tools and instruments in
the broadest sense of this term' (p. 307).
The concept of the world within actual reach is used in the definitions of
'mark', 'indication', and 'communication'.
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(10) Definition
The world within actual reach of / at t is that region of the world
containing the objects that can be perceived at / by /.
This sector of the world of perceived and perceptible objects at whose
center I am shall be called the world within my actual reach, which
includes, thus, the objects within the scope of my view and the range of my
hearing' (p. 307).
At this point we are able to define what it means for two individuals to
be in a face-to-face situation. This concept is needed later on for the
definition of communication.
(11) Definition
Two individuals andy are in a face-to-face situation if
(i) i is in the world within actual reach of j and
(ii) j is in the world within actual reach of i.
The concept of the world within potential reach is used in the definition
of 'sign'.
(12) Definition
The world within potential reach of / at t is that region of the world
containing those objects that may be brought into the actual reach
of by a change of a's position.
'In a certain sense it might be said that the part of the world within my
reach which does not belong to the manipulatory zone transcends it: it
constitutes the zone of my potential manipulations or, as we prefer to call
it, of my potential working acts' (p. 307).
'... it is a corollary of the idealization of the interchangeability of
standpoints ... that the world within actual reach of another is also within
my attainable (potential) reach and vice versa (p. 317). Remark: This
concept is used by Schütz with different interpretations: on page 307 the
concept could refer to the 'difference' between the world within actual
reach of / at t and the manipulatory sphere of / at /; on page 317 it is used
approximately in the above sense.
Schütz introduces some further concepts of 'worlds': the world within
restorable reach and the recollected world (p. 308).
The concept of the everyday world is necessary for the definition of
'symbol'.
(13) Definition
The everyday world (world of everyday life) of a group of in-
dividuals is that region of the world that contains the worlds within
possible reach of all individuals of that group.
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'... it [world of everyday life] includes those outer objects, facts, and events
which are within my actual reach and those which are within the several
zones of my potential reach (comprising those within actual and potential
reach of my fellow-men)' (p. 328).
The concept of transcendence is necessary for the definition of all semiotic
concepts listed in (1).
(14) Definition
An object a transcends a world w at / i f a does not belong to w at /.
'In a certain sense it might be said that the part of the world within my
reach which does not belong to the manipulatory zone transcends it ...'
(p. 307).
'... the world of another transcends mine (p. 317).
'... there are experiences which transcend the finite province of meaning of
the world of everyday life ...' (p. 329).
The knowledge of indications helps the individual transcend the world
within his actual reach ...' (p. 311).
Remark: It is not quite clear what sort of arguments are required for this
concept: Schütz predicates 'transcend' at various times of objects (p. 307),
sets of objects (p. 317), experiences (p. 329) and even human individuals
(p. 311). It is, of course, possible to reformulate this definition in such a
way as to comprise all these different cases, but these refinements are not
necessary for our purpose.
The concept of cogitation is necessary for the definition of 'sign'.
(15) An object a is a cogitation ofi at t if a is a thought or a feeling or a
volition of / at t.
The term "cogitation" is here used in the broadest Cartesian sense,
(denoting feelings, volitions, emotions, etc.' (p. 319).
The concept 'finite province of meaning' is necessary for the definition
of'symbol'. It presupposes the concept 'style of experience', which we take
to be primitive. We give a clarification of it in (16).
(16) e is a style of experience if e is a class of ways of experiencing
objects, e.g., dreaming or remembering or wishing, etc.
(17) Definition
A finite province of meaning is a set of objects that are experienced in
a style of experience e.
'Each province of meaning ... has its particular cognitive style. It is this
particular style of a set of our experiences which constitutes them as a
finite province of meaning' (p. 341).
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The concept of relevance is necessary for the definition of'mark'. We take
it to be a primitive concept, cf. its standardized designation in (5). We are
now in a position to define the central concepts of (1).
(18) Definition
An object a is a mark of an object b for / at r, if
(i) a is in the nanipulatory sphere of / at a moment t' prior to /
and is manipulated by / at t',
(ii) a appresents b for / at t,
(iii) b transcends the world within actual reach of ι at /,
(iv) a and b are relevant for i at /', and
(ν) ι assumes at t' that b will be relevant for / at a moment after t'.
Ί shall be able to recognize those elements which I now find relevant in the
world within my actual reach, especially within the manipulatory zone,
and which ... will prove relevant also when I return later on. I am, thus,
motivated to single out and to mark certain objects. When I return I
expect these marks to be useful as "subjective reminders" ... What counts
is merely that all these marks, themselves objects of the outer world, will
from now on be intuited not as mere "selves" in the pure apperceptual
scheme. They entered for me, the interpreter, into an appresentational
reference' (pp. 308-309).
(19) Definition
An object a is an indication of b for / at /, if
(i) / knows from previous experiences that a and b are connected,
(ii) / does not know the kind of connection between a and b,
(iii) a appresents b for / at /, and
(iv) b transcends the world within actual reach of ι at /.
'If we know that event B usually appears simultaneously or precedes or
follows event A, then I take this as a manifestation of a typical and
plausible relationship existing between A and B, although I know nothing
of the nature of this relationship. Until further notice I simply expect or
take it for granted that any future recurrence of an event of type A will be
connected in typically the same way with the preceding, concomitant, or
subsequent recurrence of an event of type B. I may then apprehend A not
as an object, fact, or event standing for itself, but standing for something
else, namely, referring to the past, present or future appearance of B'
(p. 310).
(20) Definition
An object a is a sign of b for ι at i, if
(i) a appresents b for i at i, and
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(ii) there is ay such that
(a) a is manipulated by j at some moment t' prior to t and
(b) b is a cogitation of j at some moment f .
'We propose ... to use the term "sign" for designating objects, facts, or
events in the outer world, whose apprehension appresents to an interpreter
cogitations of a fellow-man' (p. 319).
(21) Definition
An object α is a symbol for b for / at t, if
(i) a appresents b for / at r,
(ii) a is in the everday world, and
(iii) b transcends the everyday world.
'We can ... redefine the symbolic relationship as an appresentational
relationship between entities belonging to at least two finite provinces of
meaning so that the appresenting symbol is an element of the paramount
reality of everyday life' (p. 343).
The concept of communication is defined in two steps:
1. Communication is defined as a ternary relation between two in-
dividuals and a point in time.
2. This ternary relation '/ communicates withy at /' is defined with the
help of a four-placed relation '/ communicates withy at / by means
of a\
(22) Definition
An individual / communicates with individual j at t by means of a, if
(i) a is in the world within actual reach of j at t,
(ii) a is in the everyday world,
(iii) a is manipulated by ι at t,
(iv) there is a b such that
(a) α is a sign of b for i at t and
(b) a is a sign of b for j at /, and
(ν) ι intends a to be a sign of b fory at t.
'... communication requires under all circumstances both events in the
outer world, produced by the communicator, and events in the outer
world apprehensible by the interpreter. In other words, communication
can occur only within the reality of the outer world ...' (p. 322).
(23) Definition
An individual / communicates with individual j at t if there is an
object a such that / communicates with j at / by means of a.
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Using the concepts defined so far we can define other concepts of
semiotics, among them those in (4).
(24) Definition
An individual i understands the cogitation of individual j at t if there
is an object a such that α is a sign of the cogitation of j for / at /.
(25) Definition
An individual understands a at t if there is an individual j and a
cogitation b such that
(i) α is a sign of b for / at t and
(ii) b is a cogitation of j at some t' that is not later than i.
(26) Definition
An individual i is an interpreter of α at i if
(i) a is a sign of something for somebody at some time and
(ii) / understands a at t.
Theses
With the help of the concepts explicitly defined above we now state
explicitly some theses of Sch tz's semiotics. A first group of theses refers
to the different worlds that 'surround' individuals.
(27) The different worlds of the individuals are sections of the everyday
world.
This world [world of everyday life]... includes those outer objects, facts,
and events which are within my actual reach and those which are in the
several zones of my potential reach (comprising those within actual and
potential reach of my fellow-men)' (p. 328).
(28) Worlds of different individuals may overlap.
4
. . . the world within my actual reach overlaps that within his reach ...'
(p. 316).
(29) Worlds within potential reach may be transferred into worlds
within actual reach (relative to one individual).
To my unique biographical situation pertain, among many other things,
my recollections of the world within my reach in the past but no longer
within it since I moved from There to Here, and my anticipations of a
world to come within my reach and which I must move from Here to
another There in order to bring it into my reach' (p. 308).
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(30) For every world within actual reach there exist objects transcending
it.
'... the world within my actual reach carries along the open infinite
horizons of my world in potential reach, but to my experiences of these
horizons belongs the conviction that each world within potential reach,
once transformed into actual reach, will again be surrounded by new
horizons, and so on' (p. 329).
Theses (31) and (32) are combined by Schütz into the 'thesis of the
reciprocity of perspectives'.
(31) Each individual assumes that, in principle, it could have the worlds
of every other individual as its own world.
'... I take it for granted, and I assume my fellow-man does the same, that I
and my fellow-man would have typically the same experiences of the
common world if we changed places ...' (p. 316).
Schütz calls this thesis 'the general thesis of the exchangeability of
standpoints'.
(32) Every individual assumes that other individuals think essentially the
same objects to be relevant.
take it for granted until counter-evidence is offered — and I assume my
fellow-man does the same — that the differences originating in our private
systems of relevances can be disregarded for the purpose at hand ...'
(p. 316).
Schütz calls this thesis 'the general thesis of the congruence of
standpoints'.
(33) Each cogitation of an individual transcends every world within
potential reach of an arbitrary individual.
'His psychological life, however, is not given to me in originary presence
but only in copresence, it is not presented, but appresented' (p. 314).
(34) The world within actual reach of an individual is (contained) in the
world within potential reach of an arbitrary individual.
'.., the world within actual reach of another is also within my attainable
(potential) reach ...' (p. 317).
Schütz assumes that the following condition is necessary for
communication:
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(35) Two individuals / and j can communicate only by using objects of
the everyday world.
4
. . . Communication requires under all circumstances both events in the
outer world produced by the communicator, and events in the outer world
apprehensible by the interpreter' (p. 322).
This is why the everyday world is understood as a paramount province
of meaning.
Note
* This is an English version of a German paper in which we tried to reconstruct parts of A.
Schütz's semiotics for the development of a theory of communication. As our source we
used Schütz (1967). Parenthesized numbers after quotations in our paper refer to pages in
this text.
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